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DECKER V. NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER:
How JUDICIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY SAVED THE LOGGING
INDUSTRY
GREG JACKSON
On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.' With this
decision, as Justice Scalia's partial dissent correctly illustrates, the Supreme
Court's deference to an administrative agency's interpretations of its own
regulations continues to stray from the foundational principals of federalism
embodied by the separation of powers doctrine and mandated by the United
States Constitution.2 In doing so, however, the Court's decision positively
benefited society, preventing both the financial meltdown of the logging
industry and a significant increase in unemployment.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Logging andForestRoad Watershed Pollution
In September of 2006, the Northwest Environmental Defense
Center ("NEDC") filed a citizen suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon, under Section 505 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"
or "Act"), alleging various CWA violations on two Oregon logging roads.
The named defendants included state officials ("State Defendants"), who
implement the CWA in concert with the Environmental Protection Agency

. Articles Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
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1Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
2 Id. at 1339-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2014); see First Amended Complaint, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown,
476 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2007) (No. 06-1270-KI), 2006 WL 3241715; see also Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.
v. Brown, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1191 (D. Or. 2007), rev'd, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d
1063 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
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("EPA"),4 and private logging entities ("Timber Defendants") that use the
roads.s
The roads in question, Sam Downs Road and Trask River Road,
provide access to various logging sites in Oregon's Tillamook State Forest
and are used to haul timber out of the forest. 6 While the Oregon
Department of Forestry and Oregon Board of Forestry own and control the
roads, the Timber Defendants are required to maintain the roads through
contracts with the Oregon Department of Forestry.7 The roads feature a
system of roadside ditches, channels, and culverts, which are also
maintained by the Timber Defendants.8 These drainage controls ensure
stormwater runoff flows into various streams, including tributaries of the
Trask River, Kilchis River, and Tillamook Bay.9
During periods of high precipitation (0.12 inches or more), runoff
washes sediment from the roads' gravel surface through the ditches, and
eventually down into the streams and rivers.' 0 Resulting sediment deposits
adversely affect aquatic species, particularly salmon and trout that live
where this debris collects." Specifically, according to NEDC's Complaint:
[F]ine sediment deposition in spawning gravels . . . can
smother salmonid eggs, reduce intragravel oxygen,
[increase] tubidity in the water column that can interfere
with sight-feeding by salmonids, direct burial of
macroinvertebrate insects and their habitat, and bed
aggradation throughout the stream network including
accumulation of sediment in low gradient channels [can
cause] bank erosion ... impairing navigation.12
The Tillamook Bay National Estuary Project's 1998 Kilchis Watershed
Analysis describes several fish species found in the Trask and Kilshis rivers
as "species of concern."' 3 Furthermore, according to the same report, of the
Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 21, 32.
s 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2014); First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 1, 15-21; see also Nw.
Envtl. Def Citr., 640 F.3d at 1067-68, rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (describing Timber Defendants'
use of the Sam Downs Road and Trask River Road).
6 First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 5; see also Nw. Envl. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at
1067-68, rev'd,Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
7 First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 5.
' Id. at 2,5.
9Id. at 3, 63-64.
'oId. at 3, 60, 63-64.
" Id. at 61.
4 First

2

Id. (quoting TILLAMOOK BAY NAT'L ESTUARY PROJECT, KILCHIS WATERSHED ANALYSIS

57 (Bruce Follansbee & Ann Stark eds., 1998)) (internal revisions omitted).
" Id.

at 62 (citing TILLAMOOK BAY NAT'L ESTUARY PROJECT, KILCHIS WATERSHED

ANALYSIS 113 (Bruce Follansbee & Ann Stark eds. 1998)).
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five Tillamook Basin salmonid populations, only one could be considered
healthy. 14
Negative environmental consequences of runoff like those caused
by Sam Downs Road and Trask River Road are present wherever similar
transportation systems are utilized in the United States. 15 The state of
Washington, for instance, has nearly 55,000 miles of comparable roads."
Moreover, although forest road best management practice improvements
have reduced runoff impact, pollution still poses a significant problem in
many areas of the country.' 7 Best management practices, such as surfacing
roads, stabilizing areas disturbed by their construction, or disconnecting
drainage systems from streams, have been shown to reduce sediment loads
by over eighty percent. 18 Despite this potential, state implementation
requirements for these measures vary widely.19 From an environmentalist's
perspective, imposing federal CWA requirements on all logging and forest
roads via National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permitting would generate greater pollution control independent of best
management practices, on a uniform, national scale. 20 The Supreme Court's
consideration and decision on the CWA's application to Sam Downs Road
and Trask River Road is, therefore, crucial to achieving improved oversight
and ultimately reducing runoff pollution because the roads are a microcosm
of a much larger problem. Had the Court ruled that the roads were point
source discharges requiring NPDES permits, it follows that all similarly
situated logging and forest roads would also require permits - expanding
CWA requirements for forest roads nationally.

15 See Mark F. Cecchini-Beaver, "Tough Law" Getting Tougher: A Proposalfor Permitting
Idaho's Logging Road Stormwater Point Sources After Northwest Environmental Defense Center v.
Brown, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 467, 471-77 (2012) (discussing the negative impact of sediment runoff from

roads on salmonids); see also GEORGE ICE & ERIK B. SCHILLING, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR AIR & STREAM
IMPROVEMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTEMPORARY FORESTRY BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES (BMPS): FOCUS ON ROADS (2012).
16Henry I. Miller, A Supremely Important Decision About America's Logging Industry,

FORBES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrymiller/2012/l 1/29/a-supremely-importantdecision-about-americas-logging-industry/ ("The state of Washington has said that, on average, it will
need one permit per mile for all 55,000 miles of its eligible roads.").
17ICE & SCHILLING, supra note 15, at 12-17 (discussing state specific forest road runoff
pollution, the impact of specific best management practices proposed by the National Council for Air
and Stream Improvement, and noting that such practices can reduce sediment loads by over 80%).
8
Id. at 17.
'
See ERIK SCHILLING, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR AIR AND STREAM IMPROVEMENT,
COMPENDIUM OF FORESTRY BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR CONTROLLING NONPOINT SOURCE

POLLUTION INNORTH AMERICA 1-165 (2009) (detailing varying best management practice requirements
for specific states).
20See discussion infra Part II (detailing the CWA, NPDES permitting programs, and the
enforcement of both).
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B. The Logging Industry
According to the EPA, logging typically involves cutting timber,
cutting and transporting timber, or producing wood chips in the field.21
Harvesting timber begins when the standing timber is purchased, sometimes
with the underlying land.22 After trees are marked for quality, a landing area
and access roads, such as those at issue in Decker, are constructed.23 The
timber is then felled and collected at the landing area before being
transported, typically by truck, to a concentration yard or sawmill. 24
Although the dynamics vary, typically individual contractors paid on a
volume basis, crews employed by sawmills, or larger entities that handle
operations from purchase to finished product in-house perform the
harvesting process. 25
Annually, the United States' logging industry accounts for
approximately $200 billion in sales and employs one million workers.26 In
contrast to other manufacturing sectors, however, enormous corporations do
not dominate the market. 27 In fact, logging operations are most often
highly-localized small businesses.28 In 2013, for instance, the four largest
logging entities accounted for just over nineteen percent of industry
revenue. 29 Still, over the past five years, larger operations' market share has
steadily grown, 30 while the total number of private logging establishments
dropped more than twenty-five percent from 2003 to 2012." Industry
employment dropped even more from 2000 to 2008,32 reducing high-wage

21

See

Agriculture:

Forestry,

U.S.

ENvTL.

PROTECTION

AGENCY,

http://www.epa.gov/oecaagct/forestry.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (describing North American
Classification System ("NAICS") 1133 logging activities).
22Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Timber Industry - Hardwood Timber Industry, NAT'L
TIMBER TAX WEBSITE, http://www.timbertax.org/publications/irs/msp/hardwood/chapterl/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2014).
23 Id; see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
24Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Timber Industry - HardwoodTimber Industry, supra note
22.
25 id

26Id.; Agriculture: Forestry,supra note 21.
27 See Logging in
the US: Market Research Report, IBISWORLD
http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/default.aspx?indid=78.

(Aug. 2013),

28 Id
29 Id.

30 Id.

" Databases, Tables & Calculatorsby Subject, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/
(last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (the annual total of private establishments was 12,444 in 2003 compared to
just 9,148 in 2012).
32U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SECTION 18: FORESTRY, FISHING, AND MINING 561 tbl.880 (2012),
availableat https://www.census.gov/prod/201 1pubs/12statab/natresor.pdf.
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jobs.33 Significantly, since 2009, logging capacity has been reduced by onefourth.34 As consistently reduced domestic production from 1990 to 2010
(totaling nearly twenty-five percent in some areas) demonstrates, 5 the
logging industry is far from robust. This reduction persisted despite price
index increases over the same period.36 Tellingly, in 2010, fifty-one percent
of logging entities reported a loss or zero net gain. 37
A deadly combination of higher production costs, reduced demand,
greater global competition, and increased regulation continues to plague the
logging industry. The cost of raw materials and capital required for timber
harvesting has risen dramatically, with new logging equipment prices
jumping fifty percent.3 8 The timber industry experienced similar economic
woes as other sectors during the recession, 9 with new housing starts
dropping seventy-five percent from 2005 to 201 1.40 Unlike other industries,
however, demand for wood products recovered much slower. Demand for
paper products, for example, plummeted, perhaps due to increased reliance
on electronics, and seems unlikely to recover.4 1 Moreover, hardwood
lumber markets are still down forty percent from the highs seen in the
1990S.42 Simultaneously, global competitors have gained ground. China, in
particular, is emerging as a leading timber producer.43 The Campbell Group
predicts Brazil, Russia, and China will dominate new pulpwood fiber
production over the next five years." Domestically, government regulations
Agriculture: Forestry, supra note 21 (listing median logging pay by position: first-line
supervisors and managers median pay is $50,190, while sawing machine setter, operators, and tenders
receive a median of $27,490).
34
MICHAEL GOERGEN ET AL., THE STATE AND FUTURE OF U.S. FORESTRY AND THE FOREST
RECOMMENDATIONS
13 (2013), available at
INDUSTRY:
WORKSHOP REPORT AND
http://www.usendowment.org/images/Forest-Sector Report-- FINAL 9.5.13.pdf.
3 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 32, at 565 tbl.888 (displaying industrial
roundwood domestic production fell from 15,577 million cubic feet in 1990 to 11,933 million cubic feet
in 2010).
36 Id at 567 tbl.892.
3 GOERGEN ET AL., supranote 34.
38

Id

Hard Times Hit US. Hardwood Lumber Industry: Changing Consumer Tastes,
Construction Downturns Have Slashed Demand, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 6, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/23959105/#.Us4GZaVRuY.
40 Scott Bowe, Great Lakes Forest, Industry Products, and Resources Summit: Industry
Trends and Marketing Strategiesfor the HardwoodLumber Industry, U. WIS. WOOD PRODUCTS (June 6,
2012), http://sustainabledevelopmentinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Bowe-Marketing-Toolsand-Industry-Trends.pdf.
41 Dan Newman,
The Real "Growth" Industry: Timber 101, DAILYFINANCE,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/01/14/the-real-growth-industry-timber/ (last updated Jan. 14, 2013,
10:25 PM) (noting United States' newsprint consumption dropped from 8 million metric tons in 2007 to
4 million metric tons in 2011, and other paper consumption dropped from 80 million metric tons in 2007
to 65 million metric tons in 2011).
42GOERGEN ET AL., supranote 34, at 3.
43
Agriculture: Forestry,supranote 21.
4 Newman, supranote 41.
3
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hamper industry competitiveness. Under current administrative regulations,
manufacturing costs twenty percent more than in many other major
industrial nations, and compliance expenses have risen nearly eight percent
annually since 1998. Given these obstacles, it is surprising the industry
has not been reduced more substantially.
Requiring NPDES permitting for forest roads would greatly
increase financial burdens imposed by regulation compliance. According to
Frederick Cobbage and Robert Abt, in the southern states predict an
"annual [median] cost for landowners, procurement dealers, loggers, and
forest products firms . . . of about $2 billion per year[,] if every timber

harvest operation needed to obtain a NPDES permit."46 Importantly, for an
industry dominated by smaller businesses, they also project higher costs for
less experienced and/or smaller entities, or those operating tracts around 32
acres, as opposed to experienced and/or larger entities, or those harvesting
tracts of about 80 acres or greater.4 7 Experienced entities with staff could
expect expenses of about $16,000 per permit, while estimated costs for
those lacking staff or experience were roughly $24,000 per permit. 48
Similarly, ownership costs associated with NPDES permits for larger tracts
came to about $14 per acre per year, but exceed $21 per acre per year for
smaller plots. 4 9 These increased costs could substantially eliminate what
little profits timber harvest operations earn, and cause severe industry
investment decline.50 For instance, "[o]n a per harvest basis, the cost of
preparing, implementing, and monitoring NPDES forest road permits would
decrease net timber sales returns by" nineteen percent for larger owners and
seventy-one percent for smaller owners. 5 '
Similar studies project comparable cost increases in other areas of
the United States. Estimates put the total NPDES forest road permitting
costs for the Northwest between $654 million to $883 million per year.5 2
On a state-by-state basis, some expect costs to increase by "$277.2 million
in California, $66.2 million in Idaho, $165.5 million in Montana, $214.4
45GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 19.
4 Frederick Cobbage and Robert Abt are professors at North Carolina State University. Their
findings are based on analysis of existing data. FREDERICK COBBAGE & ROBERT ABT, POTENTIAL

ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF NPDES PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREST ROADS IN
THE
SOUTH
(2011),
available
at

http://search.ncforestry.orgWEBPAGES/Bullet%/20Points%20for/
%20Forest%20Roads.pdf.
47 Id.
4 Id.

2OSouth%20-

s0 Id
51Id
5 Economic Impacts ofNPDES PermitRequirement, NAT'L ALLIANCE OF FOREST OWNERS
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://nafoalliance.org/policy-solutions/epa-forest-roads-clean-water-act/economicimpacts-of-npdes-permit-requirement.
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million in Oregon, and $198.2 million in Washington."03 Additionally, with
job losses in these states estimated to total 24,000, $585 million in wages
would be lost. 14 Furthermore, the Northeastern and Lake States could
experience $100 million to over $1 billion in additional costs during the
initial permitting phase alone," with Maine alone losing up to 6,000 jobs.s
Considering these potential costs and the logging industry's already
dismal condition, the Decker litigation was of enormous importance for
industrial timber harvesting's future.
II. REGULATORY AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. The Clean Water Act
In an effort to reduce water pollution throughout the United States,
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Act ("FWPA") in 1948."
Still, despite creating a national water pollution policy regime, the FWPA
failed to effectuate fundamental change, prompting Congress to revisit the
issue in 1972, and again in 1977 when it passed revisions to the FWPA that
became the CWA. '8 The revisions instituted broad, sweeping new
regulations designed to revitalize and preserve the "chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."5 9
Under the CWA focus shifted toward controlling and severely
limiting water pollution sources. CWA Section 301(a) (codified as 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a)) for example, prohibited the unauthorized "addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source" or discharges by any
person.60 To legally discharge pollutants into navigable waters from a point
source, the discharge must be authorized by and continually comply with
CWA Section 402 (codified as 33 U.S.C. § 1342). 61 The compliance
requirements rest largely on the discharge classification as either a point
source or nonpoint source.6 2 Differences between the CWA's treatment of

id.
ss Id at n.1 (explaining that the Northeast and Midwest estimates only account for the initial
permitting phase).
56 id
5 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987)).
5 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v.
California, 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976) (describing confusion concerning regulatory authority and the
ineffective focus on the impact of pollution rather than its causes).
5 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2014).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2014).
6' 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014).
62
Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2014).
54
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the classifications reflects not only a more serious concern with point
source discharges, but also the practical limitations of such regulation.63
Further, costs associated with more stringent standards for point source
discharges provide great economic incentive to seek nonpoint source
classification.64
1. Point Source Discharges
Under the CWA point sources are defined as:
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operations, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
This term does not include agricultural
discharged.
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.
Based on this language, determining whether a discharge is considered a
point source hinges on the man-made collection systems implemented to
control runoff.66 In classifying discharges, courts have recognized the
definition's breadth.67
Barring an exception, NPDES permits are required for point source
discharges.68 These permits require applicants to first comply with the
CWA Section 307(a) effluent standards and prohibitions.69 Then, once an
NPDES permit is granted for the discharge, the holder must take steps to
ensure continued compliance through observation and testing, maintenance,
and periodic reports to the EPA.70
Importantly, the statute's language specifically exempted
"agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
63 See

League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Timber Defendants' willingness to pursue this undoubtedly expensive litigation all the
way to the Supreme Court for nearly 7 years demonstrates the importance private parties place on
avoiding point source classification. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the potential economic
impact and costs of requiring NPDES permits for forest roads).
6s 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014).
6 Id.; Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011).
67 See United States v. Lambert, 915 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.W. Va. 1996); see also League of
Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002); Concerned Area Residents for Env't
v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v. Abaston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1980).
68 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014).
69 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2014); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2014).
7o40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2014).
6
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agriculture" from NPDES permitting.7 ' Nor are "[d]ischarges incidental to
the normal operation of recreational [water] vessels" and certain
"discharges of stormwater runoff from mining operations or oil and gas
exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations or transmission
facilities" required to participate in NPDES permitting programs.72 Finally,
under the 1987 Stormwater Amendments, the EPA was given significant
discretion to determine whether NPDES permits would be required for
-73
certain types of point source discharges.
2. Nonpoint Source Discharges
Although the CWA fails to define "nonpoint source," these
discharges are typically understood as all discharges falling outside the
point source discharge definition.74 Per the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, nonpoint sources are "widely understood to be the
type of pollution that arises from many dispersed activities over large
areas . . . [which] is not traceable to any single discrete source." 7 5
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has noted a lack of confinement is indicative
of such "dispersed activities."7 6
Contrasted with regulation of point source discharges, the CWA
left nonpoint source discharges virtually unregulated. Instead of NPDES
permits, these discharges only require monitoring and status reports.
B. The SilviculturalRule
Since 1973, the EPA has attempted to exempt silvicultural
discharges from NPDES permitting. 79 The EPA's determination that
regulating logging road stormwater discharges would be "administratively
difficult if not impossible" appears to have motivated it to avoid logging
road discharge regulation altogether by defining the discharges as nonpoint

n 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014).
72 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(r), 1342(1)(2)
(2014).
1 Id. § 1342(p)(5)-(6).
74League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002).
7 Id.at 1184.
7 Id.; Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing S. REP. No.
92-414, at 98-99 (1971) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[A] non-point source of pollution is one that does not
confine to one fairly specific outlet.")).
7 See David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The
Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future,20 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 515 (1996). Compare 33 U.S.C.
§ 1329 (2014), with 40 C.F.R § 122.41 (2014).
7 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2014).
7 See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker v.
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
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sources under the Silvicultural Rule. 80
"[s]ilvicultural point source" as:

Currently, the rule defines a

[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance
related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting
facilities which are operated in connection with
silvicultural activities and from which pollutants are
discharged into the waters of the United States. The term
does not include non-point source silvicultural activities
such as . . . harvesting operations, . . . or road construction

and maintenance from which there is natural runoff.8'

For decades the EPA successfully avoided implementing NPDES
permitting for logging roads by interpreting the above language as
exempting the roads.82 In fact, as early as 1976, the EPA articulated that
man-made water control systems, when used primarily to control nonpoint
runoff produced by precipitation and unassociated with the named activities,
Applied in conjunction with the
should not be covered by the CWA.
EPA's Industrial Stormwater Rule, discussed below, the Silvicultural Rule
resulted in a lack of NPDES permitting for logging roads, such as the ones
involved in this litigation.84
C. 1987 StormwaterAmendments
In 1987, stormwater runoff regulation remained underdeveloped
and ineffective, prompting Congress to pass additional statutory
requirements.85 At that time, CWA section 402(p) was added, and later
soNw. Envtl. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1074-75, rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (the 1976 Final
Rule "meant that any natural runoff containing pollutants was not a point source, even if the runoff was
channeled and controlled through a 'discernible, confined and discrete conveyance' and then discharged
into navigable waters, if it was not associated with rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log
storage facilities" (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 56932 (Dec. 5, 1975))).
8 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2014).
"Nw. Envtl. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1080, 1086, rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (noting the
EPA wants its Silvicultural Rule to categorically exempt all runoff associated with silvicultural activities,
and has operated under the assumption NPDES permits were not required for point source discharges on
logging roads).
83Id. at 1074 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 6282 (Feb. 12, 1976)).
8 See Cecchini-Beaver, supra note 15, at 482 ("Until recently, NPDES permits were not
required for stormwater runoff from logging roads because it was assumed to be either nonpoint source
pollution ... or exempt from the Phase I and II regulations." (citing Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 476
F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196-97 (D. Or. 2007))); see also Cecchini-Beaver, supra note 15, at 476-85
(discussing the CWA's historical application to road pollution discharges); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
Brown, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2007), Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.
2011), rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
" Nw. Envil. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1081, rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (citing Pub. L. No.
100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987)); Nw. Envl. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1082 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. 32381 (Oct. 16,
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became known as the 1987 Stormwater Amendments. The amendments
classified stormwater discharges based on their associated activities, and
prescribed different requirements to each classification.8 7 The result was a
two-tier system that categorizes stormwater runoff as either Phase I or
Phase 11.88
CWA Section 402(p), however, governs only "stormwater
discharges."89 Consequently, for the "Phase" classifications to apply, the
nonpoint runoff, such as rain, must pick up pollutants, flow through a point
source, and then deposit the pollutants into navigable United States
waters. 90 Based on the type of activity it is associated with, the stormwater
point source will be classified as either Phase I or Phase H, and must
comply with different regulatory schemes based on this classification.
Thus, the first step is to determine whether runoff qualifies as stormwater
discharge, implicating the Silvicultural Rule, then, if it qualifies, classify it
as either Phase I or Phase II.
1. Phase I
CWA Section 402(p) articulated five categories of stormwater
discharges explicitly covered by Phase I regulations.9 2 All five categories
require NPDES permits. The Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center litigation concerns discharges "associated with industrial activity,"
which the statute specifically places within Phase I.94The Stormwater
Amendments did not, however, define "associated with industrial
activity." 95 Instead, Congress chose to grant the EPA discretion to
"establish regulations setting forth the permit application requirements for
stormwater discharges" associated with industrial activity.96 Therefore, if
the logging roads are "associated with industrial activity," then they are
Phase I point source discharges requiring NPDES permits.

1986) (Sen. Stafford "EPA should have developed this [stormwater] program long ago. Unfortunately,
it did not.")).
8633 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2014); Nw. Envtl. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1082,
rev'd, Decker, 133 S.
Ct. 1326.

8733
88
89

id.
id

U.S.C.

§ 1342(p)

(2014).

9 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(7), 1362(12), 1362(14) (2014).
9' 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2014).
92
d. § 13 4 2 (p)( 2 ).
9 Id. § 13 4 2 (p)(l)-( 2 ).
9 Id. § 1342(p)(2)(B); see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
99 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2014).
6 Id. § 1342(p)(4)(A).
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2. PhaseII

Phase II covers all discharges falling outside the five statutory
Phase I categories.9 7 The 1987 Amendments directed the EPA to conduct a
study of Phase II discharges, and then issue regulations for Phase II
discharges based on its findings." While Phase I unequivocally requires
NPDES permitting, Congress accorded the EPA discretion in promulgating
these Phase II regulations. Specifically, the EPA must designate which
discharges required regulation "to protect water quality." 99
D. Defining IndustrialActivity: The EPA's Revision of the Industrial
StormwaterRule
The 1987 Stormwater Amendments exempted the majority of
"discharges composed entirely of stormwater."' 00 As mentioned above, the
Stormwater Amendments required the EPA to adopt regulations defining
"associated with industrial activity." 1 01 The Supreme Court termed the
resulting regulation the Industrial Stormwater Rule, which, prior to
December 7, 2012, read as follows:1 02
Storm water discharge associated with industrial activity
means discharge from any conveyance that is used for
collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly
related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials
storage areas at an industrial plan. The term does not
include discharges from facilities or activities excluded
from the NPDES program under this part 122. For
categories of industries identified in this section, the term
includes, but it not limited to, storm water discharges
from . . . immediate access roads and rail lines used or

traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured
products, waste material, or by-products used or created by
the facility.'o3

9 Id. § 1342(p)(1)-(2).
" Id. §§ 1342(p)(2), 1342(p)(6).
9 Id. §§ 134 2 (p)( 2 ), 1342(p)(5), 1342(p)(6).
' Id. § 13 4 2 (p)(1); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1332 (2013).
'0 33 U.S.C. § 13 4 2 (p) (2014).
102Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That an NPDES Permit Is Not Required
for Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122).
10 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1332 (2013) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)).
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Importantly, the Industrial Stormwater Rule also incorporated the
Department of Labor's Standard Industrial Classification ("SIC") 24 by
reference,'0 including logging.o According to SIC 24, Industry Group
2411 defines entities engaged in logging activities as "[e]stablishments
forest or
primarily engaged in cutting timber and producing ... primary
06
wood raw materials, or producing wood chips in the field."'
On Friday, December 7, 2012, however, the EPA issued revisions
to its Phase I Industrial Stormwater Rule.107 These revisions sought to
clarify the EPA's position on stormwater discharges associated with
industrial activity. 0 8 Specifically, the altered language of 40 C.F.R. §
122.23(b)(14)(ii) states that "stormwater discharges from logging roads do
not constitute stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity and
that a NPDES permit is not required."1 09 The revision explicitly targets the
Ninth Circuit's 2011 decision, discussed below. "o Effective January 7,
2013, "the only facilities under SIC code 2411 [(a subpart of SIC 24)] that
are 'industrial' are: rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log
storage.""' The relevant portion of the Industrial Stormwater Rule now
reads:
Industrial
Standard
within
classified
Facilities
Classification 24, Industry Group 241 that are rock
crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage
facilities operated in connection with silvicultural activities
defined in 40 CFR 122.27(b)(2)-(3) and Industry Groups
242 through 249; 26 (except 265 and 267), 28 (except 283),
29, 311, 32 (except 323), 33, 3441, 373; (not included are
all other types ofsilviculturalfacilities).112

'4 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (2014).
1os Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1332; see also Industry Group 241: Logging, U.S. DEP'T LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic manual.display?id=538&tab=description (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
16 Industry Group241: Logging, supra note 105.
...
33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2014); Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That an
NPDES Permit Is Not Required for Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72970
(Dec. 7, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
08
Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That an NPDES Permit Is Not Required
for Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72970, 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
110 Id.

112Id. at 72974-75 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the new rule excludes timber harvesting as an industrial activity,
previously included under SIC 24 and the Industrial Stormwater Rule.1 13
E. Enforcement
The CWA provides the EPA with near plenary power to investigate,
enforce, and prosecute violations, including NPDES permitting. 114 In
addition to such governmental action, however, the CWA also provided an
avenue for private enforcement. Private citizens are permitted to bring
action against "any person .

.

. who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an

effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by
the Administrator or a State." "' Violations of effluent standards or
limitations include unlawful violations of CWA Sections 301(a) and
402(p)."' 6 Additionally, the "prevailing or substantially prevailing party"
may recover litigation costs where the court deems appropriate.'
The expansive language allowing citizens suits is, however, limited
by the CWA's judicial review mechanism.118 CWA Section 509(b) provides
judicial review of:
[T]he Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any
standard of performance under section 1316 of this title,
(B) in making any determination pursuant to section
1316(b)(1)(C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent
standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under
section 1317 of this title, (D) in making any determination
as to a State permit program submitted under section
1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating any
effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311,
1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title, (F) in issuing or denying
any permit under section 1342 of this title, and (G) in
promulgating any individual control strategy under section
1314(1) of this title, may be had by any interested person in
[a] the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States . ...
Any such application shall be made within 120 days from
the date of such determination, approval, promulgation,
"' Compare id. at 72970, and 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2014), with 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(b)(14) (2006).
114 33 U.S.C. § 1319
(2014).
"'6 Id. § 1365.
' Id. § 1365(f)(1).
"Id. § 1365(d).
8
" Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker v. Nw.
Enytl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).

2013-2014]

How JUDICIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY SAVED LOGGING

381

issuance or denial, or after such date only if such
application is based solely on grounds which arose after
such 120th day . . . . Action of the Administrator with

respect to which review could have been obtained under
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be subject to
judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for
enforcement." 9
According to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of this rule, which the
Supreme Court validated,12 0 the subject matter of a citizen suit may be
limited by the 120-day rule.12' Actions questioning the validity of certain
EPA actions must be brought within 120 days or all judicial review will be
forfeited.1 2 2 But, this "does not bar a district court from entertaining a
citizen suit under [33 U.S.C.] § 1365 when the suit is against an alleged
violator and seeks to enforce an obligation imposed by the Act or its

regulations."l 2 3
F. PotentialCivil & CriminalLiabilityfor Violations
Under CWA Section 309, a court or the EPA Administrator may
assess penalties for permit violations up to $25,000 per day per violation.12 4
Where one act results in multiple simultaneous violations, each "pollutant
parameter" breach is treated individually; meaning multiple CWA
violations potentially create liability for each violation separately. 125 in
addition to penalties, citizen suits carry liability for litigation costs and
other forms of monetary or equitable relief for losing entities.12 6
The CWA also creates criminal liability for "any responsible
corporate officer"127 based on levels of culpability. 128 Negligent permit
violation convictions carry a $2,500 to $25,000 per-day fine and/or up to
one-year imprisonment. 129 Knowing breaches may result in $5,000 to
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b).
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1334-35.
121 Nw. Envtl. Def Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1068, rev'd,Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
122 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2012); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1334-35; Nw. Envtl.
Def Ctr., 640 F.3d
119

120

at 1068.

Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1334.
124
25 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d) (2014).
123

1 1

d. § 1319(d).

§ 1365(a) (allowing district courts to assess civil penalties and "enforce such an
effluent standard or limitation"); Id. § 1365(d) (allowing awards of litigation costs "to any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party," and equitable relief); Id. § 1365(e) (preserving any other applicable
common law or statutory party rights).
"'
2 Id § 1319(c)(6).
1 d § 1319(c).
129
1d § 1319(c)(1).
126

Id.
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$50,000 per-day fines and/or imprisonment for up to three years. 13 0 If a
knowing violation puts "another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury," the conviction carries a $250,000 fine and/or up to a
fifteen-year imprisonment.' 3 ' Finally, knowing false statements on permit
applications or dishonestly disrupting monitoring is punishable by a fine up
to $10,000 and/or up to two-year imprisonment.132
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FirstAmended Complaint and DistrictCourt Action
The NEDC's First Amended Complaint, filed in September of 2008,
alleged various permit violations, and requested: (1) injunctive relief to
ensure compliance with the CWA; (2) environmental-remedial relief to
rectify past harms from the discharges; (3) a declaratory judgment stating
Defendants violated and continue to violate the CWA; (4) civil penalties
against the Timber Defendants; and (5) litigation expenses. 133 First, the
NEDC alleged the Defendants violated the CWA "by discharging pollutant
and/or industrial stormwater from point sources along" the Trask River
Road and Sam Downs Road "to waters of the United States without NPDES
permits." 134 Second, NEDC contended the Defendants violated and
continue to violate the above CWA Sections "by failing to apply for
NPDES permits for their discharges of pollutants and/or industrial
stormwater from point sources along the Trask River Road, the Sam Downs
Road, and other logging roads in the Oregon State Forests." 35 According to
the NEDC, NPDES permits were required for both roads, and these
violations, both past and present, were the result of "discharging pollutants
and/or industrial stormwater from point sources along the .

.

. [roads] to

waters of the United States without NPDES permits."' 36 It should be noted
that, if NPDES permits are not required for either road, then rio violation of
the CWA exists, and the Defendants cannot be held liable. Consequently,
the litigation's deciding issue was whether NPDES permits are required.137
After the NEDC filed its complaint, both the State Defendants and
the Timber Defendants filed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

130 1d. § 1319(c)(2).
"' Id. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
132Id § 1319(c)(4).
133First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at VII:A-G.
Id. at 85, 89.

at 92.
at 85, 89.
17See generally Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
31Id.
136Id
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motions to dismiss, and raised three challenges to the NEDC's suit.' 38 First,
the Defendants argued that the NEDC failed to allege sufficient facts in its
First Amended Complaint to maintain representational standing.139 Second,
they claimed the NEDC did not to meet the CWA's procedural
prerequisites for bringing a CWA citizen suit.140 Finally, the Defendants
contended that NPDES permits were not required for the logging roads.141
The litigation has focused on these three contentions.14 2
The District Court was convinced, and dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim.14 3 According to the court, NEDC had standing
because a particular member could later be identified during discovery, and
it was not "beyond doubt that NEDC [could] prove no set of facts in
support of its complaint which would entitle it to relief."'" Relying on a
2002 Ninth Circuit opinion, the district court found that NEDC could bring
a citizen suit because such suits may be brought to require a permit.14 5
Despite this, however, the District Court ultimately concluded:
[T]he plain language of § 4 02 (p)[ 3 3 U.S.C. § 1342]
authorizes EPA to issue regulations designating which
stormwater discharges are to be regulated and which are to
be left unregulated. When those Phase II regulations went
into effect, a stormwater discharge left unregulated fell into
compliance with § 402(p) unless EPA or an authorized
state agency later exercised its residual designation
authority to require an NPDES permit for that discharge. A
stormwater discharge that complies with § 402(p) does not
violate § 301(a) [33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)]. 46
Thus, the District Court dismissed NEDC's claims. 47

"' Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1190 (D. Or. 2007), rev'd, Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd,Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
39
1 Id. at 1191.
140Id. at
141Id. at
42

1
'

4

1192.
193-99.

See Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd,Decker, 133 S.

Ct. 1326.
'Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1192 (D. Or. 2007), rev'd, Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
145Id. at 1193 (citing Ass'n to Protect Hamersly, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor
Res., Inc.,
299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)).
'4Id at 1199 (quoting Conservation Law Found. v. Hannaford Bros., 327 F. Supp. 2d 325,
331 (D. Vt. 2004)).
147

id
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B. The Ninth Circuit CourtofAppeals'Decision
NEDC appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where the District Court
opinion was reversed and remanded. 148 The defendants requested a
rehearing, however, and the Ninth Circuit withdrew the 2010 opinion and
superseded it with a new, nearly identical opinion in May 2011, denying the
defendants' motions for rehearing and a rehearing en banc.14 9 Just as in the
2010 opinion, the Ninth Circuit overruled the District Court's dismissal,
and ultimately concluded that "stormwater runoff from logging roads that is
collected by and then discharged from a system of ditches, culverts, and
channels is a point source discharge for which an NPDES permit is
required," effectively invalidating the Silvicultural Rule, as interpreted by
the EPA.'
After first finding subject matter jurisdiction appropriate, the Ninth
Circuit based its decision on the statutory language defining a point source
discharge, and the relationship between the Silvicultural Rule and the 1987
Stormwater Amendments. '5 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
CWA's point source discharge definition understands natural runoff to be
transformed into a point source discharge when it "is collected, channeled,
and discharged through a system of ditches, culverts, channels, and similar
conveyances."' 52 Based on the presence of man-made collection systems
controlling the runoff along the roads, the court reasoned that the language
inescapably defined the logging roads in question to be point sources.
Considering the Silvicultural Rule and the 1987 Amendments, the
Ninth Circuit first found that:
[t]he text of the CWA distinguishes between point and
nonpoint sources depending on whether the pollutant is
channeled and controlled through a 'discernible, confined,
discrete conveyance' . . . [while] [t]he Silvicultural Rule,

by contrast, categorically distinguishes between the two
types of discharges depending on the source of the
54
pollutant.

Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 627 F.3d 1176, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010).
t4 9 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
"Old. at 1070, 1087.
1s

"' Id. at 1069-87.
12

s Id. at 1071.

"5 Id. at 1073, 1087.
14Id.

at 1078 (internal citations omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14)

(2014)).
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The differing criteria prompted the court to question whether the
Silvicultural Rule was a permissible interpretation of the CWA.'5s Rather
than invalidate the rule, however, the court interpreted it to not exempt the
roads.15 6 As for the 1987 Amendments, the Ninth Circuit concluded "that
the 1987 amendments to the CWA . .. [did] not exempt from the NPDES

permitting process stormwater runoff from logging roads that is collected in
a system of ditches, culverts, and channels, and .

.

. discharged."'

The

collected runoff was properly considered a point source discharge
associated with industrial activity, covered by Phase I regulations. 158
Additionally, the EPA could not exempt these discharges from its Phase I
regulations by referencing the Silvicultural Rule.159 Thus, according to the
Ninth Circuit, stormwater runoff from the logging roads, when controlled
by man-made collection systems, was a point source discharge and required
NPDES permitting.160
C. NEDC Action ChallengingEPA's Regulation Revision
The NEDC also filed a challenge to the new regulation on January
4, 2013, pursuant to CWA Section 509(b), the Administrative Procedure
Act, and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 15(a).161 While this appears
to complicate the litigation, the challenge is merely a protective petition
designed to preserve a challenge to the revision in case the Supreme Court
determines the final rule is subject to challenge in the Court of Appeals
under CWA 509(b), which requires challenges to regulations promulgated
under the CWA to be challenged within 120 days of the EPA
Administrator's signing. 162 Consequently, the challenge serves only to
ensure NEDC an avenue to challenge the revised regulation.
D. Supreme CourtAppeal & Oral Arguments
Following the Ninth Circuit's final decision, Doug Decker, who
replaced Marvin Brown as the Oregon State Forester in 2011, and GeorgiaPacific West, Inc., one of the private defendants, appealed to the United
155d.
1s6 Id

at 1080.
'" Id at 1085.
158Id.

159Id
'6o Id at 1087.
16133 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2014); 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2014); FED. R. APP. P. 15(a); Petition for
Review and Corporate Disclosure Statement, Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Jackson, No.
13-70057, at 2 (9th Cir. 2013), availableat http://environblog.jenner.com/files/click-here-10.pdf.
16233 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1); Petition for Review and Corporate Disclosure Statement, supra
note 161, at 3.
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States Supreme Court. 163 The Court granted both writs for certiorari,
consolidating the cases and allotting one hour for oral argument. 164
Unfortunately, following oral arguments, the EPA issued its Industrial
Stormwater Rule revisions.165 Both the parties and the Supreme Court were
aware of the impending changes prior to oral arguments. 166 This
substantially changed the content of the oral argument, which focused on
the proper action the Supreme Court should take, rather than the merits of
the case.167
At oral arguments, on behalf of the Petitioners, Timothy S. Bishop
urged the Court to consider the merits of the case, despite the impending
revision. 16 Stressing judicial efficiency and deference to the EPA, he
argued the case should be decided in the Petitioners' favor under the 1987
Stormwater Amendments, and that the revision simply codified the EPA's
prior interpretation of earlier regulations.16 9 Malcolm L. Stewart, on behalf
of the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioners, argued the
EPA's revision made the case moot. 170 The Court was not very receptive to
Stewart's mootness argument, and admonished him for not informing the
Court of revision sooner. 7' Jeffery L. Fisher made arguments on behalf of
the Respondent. 172 According to Mr. Fisher, the best course of action was to
dismiss as improvidently granted and remand for further consideration on

the merits.17 3

163Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.
2011) (No. 11-338), 2011 WL 4352279; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Georgia-Pacific W., Inc., v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-347), 2011 WL 4352287; Doug Decker Selected
FORESTRY,
OR.
DEP'T
Forester,
State
New
Oregon
as
http://www.oregon.gov/ODF/Pages/newsroom/newsreleases/2011/NRI105.aspx (last visited Jan. 11,
2013).
" Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012); Georgia-Pacific W., Inc., v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012).
165Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That an NPDES Permit Is Not Required
for Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122).
' See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., (No. 11-338); see
also Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That an NPDES Permit Is Not Required for
Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 122).
167See id.; see also Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That an NPDES Permit
Is Not Required for Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (the revisions are dated for the Friday following oral arguments, but the
EPA administrator signed the rule the Friday before oral arguments).
168Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 12:17-23.
16 Id at 4-18.
"o Id. at 18-28.
171 id
" Id. at 28-49.
173 Id
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The Court seemed most receptive to Fisher's argument. 174 On
January 8, 2013, however, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' motion
for supplementary briefing, and issued an order providing the parties with
an opportunity to file briefs on the effect of the new regulations by January
22, 2013.175 On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that NPDES
permits were not required for the logging roads. 176
IV. THE MARCH 20,2013 DECISION: DECKER V. NORTHWEST
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER

The Supreme Court's 7-1 opinion found the EPA determination of
the Industrial Stormwater Rule "a reasonable interpretation of its own
regulation; and, in consequence," the rule should be accorded deference
under Auer v. Robbins.'77 Justice Kennedy authored to majority opinion,
while Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, contributed a
concurring opinion.178 Justice Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part,
while Justice Breyer participated in neither the case's consideration nor the

decision. 179
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
The majority first found NEDC's citizen suit permissible because it
did "not seek an implicit declaration that the regulations were invalid as
written." 180 Second, turning to the mootness question, the Court recognized
that Article III justiciability required a live case or controversy throughout
all litigation stages.' 8 ' But, because assessment of CWA civil penalties,
attorney's fees, and environmental remedial costs against the Defendants,
"the cases remain[ed] live and justiciable, for the possibility of some
remedy for a proven past violation . . . [was] real and not remote."' 82
Consequently, the new EPA regulations did not moot the litigation.183

id.

174
1s

Memorandum Decisions at 927, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013)

(No. 11-338).
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336-39.
"' Id.at 1331 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
116

IsoId. at 1335 (quoting Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 573 (2007))
(internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted).
181Id.

I82id.
13

Id. at 1335-36.
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Surprisingly, given the Ninth Circuit's extensive treatment,' the
Court's analysis focuses very little on the EPA's Silvicultural Rule. 185
Beyond concluding that under the "rule, any discharge from a loggingrelated source that qualifies as a point source requires an NPDES permit
unless some other federal statutory provision exempts it from that coverage,"
it is hardly mentioned.' 8 6 The agency's partial admission that its rule's
"reference to natural runoff associated with logging roads neither clearly
encompasses nor clearly excludes the sort of channeled runoff at issue,"
perhaps explains this.'8 1 Still, the Court recognized the revision's purpose
was "to bring within the NPDES permit process only those logging
operations that involve the four types of activity . . .

defined as point

sources by the explicit terms of the Silvicultural Rule." 88
Turning to the merits, the Court primarily focused on the EPA's
interpretation of its unamended Industrial Stormwater Rule, which excluded
logging from "associated with industrial activity" under the 1987
Stormwater Amendments.18 9 According to the majority, "petitioners were
required to secure NPDES permits for the discharges of stormwater runoff
only if the discharges were associated with industrial activity," as defined
by the unamended Industrial Stormwater Rule.' 90 If not, the CWA's general
exemption of "discharges composed entirely of stormwater" would apply,
and NPDES permits were not required.' 9'
After determining the EPA's narrowed definition of "associated
with industrial activity" was permissible because the statute did not outline
its scope, the Court considered whether the EPA's interpretation of its
Industrial Stormwater Rule was reasonable.192 According to the majority,
the EPA could reasonably "conclude that the conveyances at issue
[were] .

.

. directly related only to the harvesting of raw materials, rather

than to manufacturing, processing, or raw materials areas," specified by the

'" See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1073-80 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker,
133 S. Ct. 1326 (discussing the EPA's Silvicultural Rule).
18
1 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326.
'"6 Id. at 1331.
' Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Decker v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (Nos. 11-338, 11-347), 2012 WL 3864278 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(characterizing the statement as an admission that the discharges were not natural runoff).
"' Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333 (the four activities include rock crushing, gravel washing, log
sorting, and log storage facilities).
' Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p); Revisions to Stormwater Regulations To Clarify That
an NPDES Permit Is Not Required for Stormwater Discharges From Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg.
72970, 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
'9 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B)) (citing 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(b)(14) (2006)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'9' Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1)).
'2 Id. at 1336-37.
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rule. 193 Furthermore, the regulation's "at an industrial plant" language
provided an additional exclusionary basis, supporting an application to only
"more fixed and permanent [facilities] than timber-harvesting
operations." 194 Considered wholly, the Court found "the regulation's
references to facilities, establishments, manufacturing, processing, and an
industrial plan leave open the rational interpretation that the regulation
extends only to traditional industrial buildings such as factories and
associated sites, as well as other relatively fixed facilities." 9 s
Under Auer deference, which the Court found applicable because
the EPA was consistently interpreting its own regulation, the "EPA's
interpretation ... [was] a permissible one."' 96 This deference approach does
not require that an agency's interpretation be the best or only possible
reading to survive. 197 Instead, where an agency is interpreting its own
regulation, courts are to accord its understanding deference, absent a plainly
erroneous or inconsistent reading.'98 Here, the EPA's rational interpretation
satisfied this requirement, and "[t]he pre-amendment version of the
Industrial Stormwater Rule .

..

permissibly ...

exempt[ed] discharges of

channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads from the NPDES
permitting scheme." 99
B. ChiefJusticeRoberts' Concurrence,Joined by Justice Alito
Chief Justice Roberts, responding to Justice Scalia's partial
concurrence and partial dissent, believed "serious questions" had been
raised regarding administrative deference. 20 0 Although the concurrence
wished to reconsider the underlying principles, it argued this was not the
appropriate case. 20 1 The parties only committed one footnote each to the
subject, and only two amicus briefs out of twenty-two seriously addressed
the matter's merits. 202 Considering the administrative law doctrine's
foundational nature and regular judicial consideration, Chief Justice

'9 Id. at 1337 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19 Id.
95

' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
'" Id. at 1337-38 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012))
(consistent interpretation of the Industrial Stormwater Rule buttressed the application of Auer deference).
9

' ' Id. at 1337.

'9Id (quoting Chase Bank USA v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871 (2011)).
'9 Id. at 1337-38.
200 Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410 (1945); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
201 id
2
20 Id. at 1338-39.
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Roberts concluded that an alteration of important precedent required the
issue be raised and argued properly.203
C. Justice Scalia's PartialConcurrenceand PartialDissent
Although Justice Scalia agreed the case was justiciable and
NEDC's citizen suit was not barred, 204 his scathing dissent challenged the
constitutionality of Auer deference on separation of powers grounds before
concluding the Industrial Stormwater Rule required the logging roads have
NPDES permits.20 5 According to Justice Scalia, deference required the
Court to baselessly yield to agencies' interpretations of regulations they
wrote. 206 By focusing on the plausibility of an agency's regulatory
interpretation and the regulation's intent, the Court has granted agencies too
much authority, impermissibly straying from the foundational premises of
statutory and regulatory interpretation: 207 "[w]hether governing rules are
made by the national legislature or an administrative agency,

. .

. [the Court

is] bound by what they say, not by the unexpressed intention of those who
made them." 2 08 Although the dissent recognized the merit of the doctrine's
justifications, this principle remained inescapable.20 9
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued the entire doctrine flew in the
face of the Constitution's separation of powers principles and structure. 2 10
Accordingly, a comparison of Auer deference and Chevron deference
reveals the former's central flaw. 211 Chevron deference, which allows
Congress to confer agencies discretion to administer a statute via
interpretive regulation, grants agencies a level of authority "courts must
respect, regarding the meaning of the statute." 212 Yet, despite this broad
power, Congress remains unable to increase its own sphere of influence
because another branch, either the Judiciary or Executive, must determine
the statute's meaning.2 13 To the contrary, Auer deference allows an agency
to assume not only a legislative role in writing regulations, but also a
judiciary function in interpreting them. 214 Consequently, such agency
activity embodies the exact political structure the Constitution sought to
20 Id. at 1339.
204Id (Scalia, J.,
205

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 1339-44.

206

207

1d

at 1339.

Id. at 1339-40.
200Id. at 1340 (emphasis in original).
20

4
d

21o Id. at

1340-41.
id
212Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
213 Id. at 1341.
214 id.
211

2013-2014]

How JUDICIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY SAVED LOGGING

391

eradicate, 215 and "contravenes one of the great rules of separation of
powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation."2 16
As for the EPA regulations in question, Justice Scalia urged the
Court apply the fairest reading of the regulations. 2 17 Accordingly, because
runoff from the logging roads is collected and discharged via ditches, pipes,
and channels, the roads are plainly a point source discharge under the
CWA.218 Indeed, in Justice Scalia's view, the roads match the CWA's point
source definition identically, and any application of the Silvicultural Rule
otherwise openly contradicts the statute's definition. 21 9 Furthermore, under
this analysis, the Industrial Stormwater Rule does not provide refuge
either.220 The rule provides that, for any of the eleven listed industries,
"discharges are associated with industrial activity if they come from sites
used for transportation of any raw material." 22 1 Thus, because the Timber
Defendants utilize the roads to transport logs (a raw material), if timber
harvesting is an industry the regulation covers, the discharges fall within
Phase I of the 1987 Stormwater Amendments and require NPDES
permits.222 Industry Group No. 2411, under SIC 24, which the regulation
incorporates by reference, includes logging as entities primarily devoted to
harvesting timber. 223 For Justice Scalia, the logging roads, therefore,
explicitly require NPDES permitting because the Timber Defendants used
them to transport raw materials while harvesting timber.22 4
Going further and considering the EPA and majority interpretations
of the Industrial Stormwater Rule, Justice Scalia insisted the fairest reading
required NPDES permits for the roads. 22 5 First, the interpretative doctrine
of the Rule of Last Antecedent, which dictates "a limiting clause or
phrase .. . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase
that it immediately follows,,, 22 6 meant "at an industrial plant" only modified
"raw material storage areas."22 7 Consequently, Justice Scalia concluded this
meant "manufacturing and processing anywhere, including in the forest,
would be associated with industrial activity." 22 8 Second, Justice Scalia
rejected the EPA and the majority's traditionally fixed industrial site
215

Id (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).

216Id

at 1342.

218

Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(14)).

2 19
22 0

Id. at 1342-43.
Id at 1343-44.

221Id. at

1343 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

222 Id
223

Id (citing Industry Group 241: Logging, supra note 105).
Id
225Id at 1343-44.
226 Id at 1343 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540
U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
224

227
228

Id at 1343-44; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14).
Id at 1343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interpretation because other covered activities, such as producing wooden
ships in the field, were just as impermanent as timber harvesting. 229 Thus,
according to Justice Scalia, when the underlying rule's language was
considered, the fairest reading required NPDES permitting program
participation.230
V. JUSTICE SCALIA IS RIGHT: "ENOUGH IS ENOUGH." 23 1
A. Separation of PowersPrinciplesand Role in the UnitedStates'Federal
Government System
The separation of powers doctrine, embodied in the United States
Constitution,232 seeks to preserve liberty,233 and is "crucial" to the United
States' system of government.2 34 As James Bryce observed in 1888, "[t]he
fundamental characteristic of the American National Government is its
separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments," which
was the Founding Fathers' central aim during the Philadelphia
Convention. 2 35 Divided spheres of influence can be "traced back to the ...
fundamental wellsprings of democracy: the writings of John Locke and
Charles de Montesquieu; the Founding Father's constitutional debates; and
the Federalist Papers."23 6
Because "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny," 237 the Constitution sought to preserve liberty by
creating a system where independent governmental branches checked each
other's actions through the removal of each power to "separate and distinct"
governmental bodies. 238 The healthy fear of encroachment leading to
despotism motivated this, and has been a basic tenant of our system since
its inception 239 that remains highly relevant today. 240 Exercising its Article

1

2

1 d. at 1344.

230id

Id. at 1339.
U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III (dividing legislative, executive, and judicial power between
the three branches of the federal government).
233 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James
Madison).
234 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
725 (1986).
235 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH
216 (1888).
236 Sheldon Whitehouse, The Impetuous Vortex, 7 R.I. B. J.
43, 7 (1995).
237 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James
Madison).
238 Id., see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, II, III (dividing legislative, executive,
and judicial power
between the three branches of the federal government).
2
"The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate powers of all departments in one, and
thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism." Book v. State Office of Bldg.
Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 294 (Ind. 1958) (quoting George Washington, Farewell Address (1796)).
131

232See

2013-2014]

How JUDICIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY SAVED LOGGING

393

III role in reviewing executive and legislative action,241 the Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of the constitutional scheme of the
separation of governmental powers into three coordinated branches. 242
Justice Scalia's partial dissent merely asks the Court to reaffirm this once
again, within the context of administrative law.243
B. Auer Deference UnconstitutionallyPermits SeparationofPowers
Violations
Auer deference not only allows an agency to write regulations, but
also allows it to interpret and enforce those regulations, assuming the role
of all three federal branches in violation of constitutional separation of
powers. The EPA's conduct regarding both the Silvicultural Rule and
Industrial Stormwater Rule clearly demonstrates this. The agency exercised
quasi-legislative power when promulgating the regulations. 24 It usurped the
federal judiciary's role when it interpreted the meaning of its regulations. 245
And, when NPDES permitting is required, the EPA utilizes its executive
power by enforcing permitting schemes.24 6 Thus, the EPA's promulgation,
interpretation, and enforcement of regulations consolidated in one branch
the powers that the Constitution vests in the legislature, judiciary, and
executive branches. This merger illustrates the "accumulation of powers"
James Madison warned was "the very definition of tyranny," 247 and the
Framers' separation of powers scheme sought to prevent.248 Consequently,
240 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339-44 (2013) (Scalia,
J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-11 (2011)
(discussing separation of powers regarding an Article III challenge to a bankruptcy court's disposition).
241 See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803) (declaring the

Court's power to review the constitutionality of congressional acts); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170
(1804) (reviewing a ship commander's actions undertaken pursuant to presidential instructions).
242Humphey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935).
243 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
244 See U.S. CONST. art I (providing Congress the power to enact legislation); see also
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (noting Congress' Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, Commerce
Clause power allows it to pass legislation regulating activities affecting commerce among the several
states); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2013) (Industrial Stormwater Rule promulgated by the EPA).
245 See U.S. CONST. art. III (describing the federal judiciary branch's interpretive role); see
also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (interpreting statutory
language of the Clean Air Act, enacted by Congress); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063,
1067-87 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (discussing the EPA's interpretations of the
Silvicultural Rule and Industrial Stormwater Rule).
246 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,
and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2014)
(providing the EPA with authority to investigate, enforce, and prosecute CWA violations, including
NPDES permitting violations); Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) ("[I]t is the president's duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.").
247 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
248 See I BRYCE, supra note 235, at 216; see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, II, III (dividing
legislative, executive, and judicial power between the three branches of the federal government).

394

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 6 No. 2

as Justice Scalia correctly observed, this plainly violates the constitutional
separation of powers by impermissibly combining the roles of the three
branches in one centralized governmental body. 249
C Auer Deference Doctrine is an UnconstitutionalExercise ofLegislative
Power by the FederalJudiciary
The separation of powers doctrine applies equally to all federal
government branches, including the judiciary. 250 When the Court grants
executive agencies quasi-judicial interpretive powers under Auer deference,
it unconstitutionally infringes upon Congress' power to confer federal
judicial power. 251' By yielding to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations absent "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" interpretations, 252
Auer deference implicitly grants the EPA, or any other agency, authority to
interpret their own rules. 253 Although Congress may delegate administrative
authority, including allowing agencies to write interpretive regulations and
requiring courts to respect these agency determinations, 25 4 allowing the
agency to interpret those regulations is entirely different.255 Instead of
congressionally authorized quasi-legislative powers of creation exercised
when an agency promulgates interpretive regulations, determining the
meaning of those regulations is judicial in nature, and an exercise of Article
III capacities.
The Constitution does not grant the federal judiciary the power to
expand the role of the Executive branch.256 Nor does it wholly grant the
Supreme Court the power to determine its sphere of review. 257 To the
contrary, except in a few specific circumstances, under Article III, Section 2,
of the Constitution, "the disposal of the judicial power belongs to
Congress" 25 8 because "Congress, having the power to establish the courts,
249 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339-42 (2013)
(Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting agency action under Auer deference violates
constitutional separation of powers).
250 See Baker v. Carr, 367 U.S. 691 (1962) (refusing to consider
issues under the Political
Question Doctrine based on separation of powers principles).
251 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850) (recognizing general congressional
control over
federal jurisdiction).
2 52
Id. at 1337 (quoting Chase Bank USA v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).
253Id. at 1338-41 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
2
Id. at 1340 (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
2
sId. at 1341.
256 CompareU.S. CONST. art. III., with U.S. CONsT. art. II, §3, and U.S. CONST.
art. I.
257See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 566
(1868) (noting the
Court's appellate jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution, but conferred by Congress, suggesting at
least some congressional influence over its appellate jurisdiction).
258Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (quoting Turner v. Bank of N. Am.,
4 U.S. 8, n.a
(1799)).
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must define their respective jurisdictions." 259 Thus, conveying federal
jurisdiction and conferring certain bodies with judicial interpretive powers
falls within the legislature's sphere.260 Auer deference, as a judicial doctrine,
effectively confers quasi-judicial Article III interpretive powers on
executive agencies without congressional approval, unconstitutionally
violating fundamental separation of powers principles. Therefore, the
doctrine is unconstitutional.
VI. APPLICATION OF AUER DEFERENCE PROBABLY SAVED THE
LOGGING INDUSTRY

A. Absent Auer Deference, the Logging Roads Require NPDES Permits
under Applicable Regulations
The majority's disposition, that the logging roads did not require
NPDES permits, was wholly based on Auer deference and the EPA's
rational interpretation of its regulations. 261 Absent this unconstitutional
reliance on Auer deference, an application of Justice Scalia's fairest reading
approach dictates that the CWA and its accompanying regulations plainly
require NPDES permitting for the roads.262
As Justice Scalia illustrates, when considered based on whether
"what the petitioners did . . . [was] proscribed by the fairest reading of the
regulations," the requirement for permitting and CWA violations for failure
to acquire permits becomes clear.263 First, the roads are unambiguously
point source discharges under the CWA's plain language264 because they
control stormwater runoff "through a series of pipes, ditches, and
channels."26 5 Under this simple CWA application, the Silvicultural Rule
does not exempt the roads as natural runoff. 26 6 Second, the Industrial
Stormwater Rule applies, requiring NPDES under the 1987 Stormwater
Amendments' Phase I point source discharge control scheme. 267 This
id.
id
261See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1336-39
(2013).
262Id. at 1342-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It has been
suggested
the Supreme Court, in abandoning Auer deference, should or probably would adopt the "one-bite"
regulatory interpretation rule followed by the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. The Supreme Court 2012
Term: Leading Cases: Federal Statutes and Regulations: Clean Water Act - Decker v. Northwest
Defense Center, 127 HARV. L. REv. 328, 335 (2013). Under this approach, an agency is provided a
limited opportunity to clarify regulations' meaning after promulgation. Id.
263See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
264 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2008) (defining a "point source" as "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, and conduit").
265 Decker, 133 S. Ct at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
266 Id at 1342-43 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); 40
C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1)).
2671d at 1343-44.
259
260
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includes the transportation of raw materials, such as logs, within its defined
activities associated with industrial activity, and, consequently, falls under
Phase I if the transportation is for a covered industrial activity.2 68 Under
SIC 24 Industry Group 2411, logging, is considered an industrial activity.269
Both the Sam Downs Road and Trask River Road require NPDES permits
because they are used for a covered associated activity by a covered
industry. 2 70 Therefore, absent application of Auer deference, all of the
United States' forest roads with comparable point source discharges, or
discharging stormwater runoff controlled by manmade irrigation systems
into navigable waters, would require NPDES permits.
B. The FinancialConsequences ofRequiringNPDES Permitsfor All
ComparableForestRoads Would be Astronomical
Previously discussed cost estimates for implementing an NPDES
permitting program on a national scale for all eligible forest roads put the
total expense well into the billions of dollars. Annual implementation costs
have been predicted to be as high as $2 billion for southern states2 7' and
between $654-$883 billion for the Northwest, while initial permitting alone
might cost between $100 million and $1 billion in northeastern and lake
states.272 Moreover, for inexperienced and/or smaller firms, compliance is
expected to be even more expensive. 273 On the whole, NPDES permitting
could mean a net per harvest sales reduction in southern timber harvesting
operations between nineteen percent for entities working larger tracts and
seventy-one percent for smaller tracts.274 Implementation would also be
expensive for state governments. Washington State, for instance, predicted
"all 55,000 miles of its eligible roads" would require approximately one
permit per mile, at an average processing cost of $2,800 per permit. 2 75
Additionally, legal expenses and civil liability would push total
expenditures even higher, as citizen suits allow courts to award penalties,
equitable relief, and litigation costs to the prevailing or substantially
prevailing party.2 76 The CWA also provides for civil penalties up to
Id at 1343 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)).
I (citing Industry Group 241: Logging, supra note 105).
Id
270 id
271 See COBBAGE & ABT, supra
note 46.
272 See Economic Impacts of NPDES Permit Requirement, supra note
52, at n. 1 (explaining
the Northeast and Lake States estimated implementation costs on include initial permitting).
273See COBBAGE & ABT, supra note
46.
268

69

274

id

275 See

Miller, supranote 16.
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) (allowing district courts to assess civil penalties and "enforce
such an effluent standard or limitation"); Id. § 1365(d) (allowing awards of litigation costs "to any
prevailing or substantially prevailing party," and equitable relief); Id. § 1365(e) (preserving any other
applicable common law or statutory party rights).
276 33
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$25,000 per-day per violation.277 If NEDC had prevailed and the Supreme
Court ruled NPDES permits were required, assuming an assessment of
maximum penalties and all requested relief, the Defendants' financial
burden is astronomical. Civil penalties for just one CWA violation on the
Sam Downs Road and Trask River Road, respectively, for the litigation's
duration would total $59,325,000 per road.278 NEDC, as the prevailing
party, would also be entitled to nearly seven years of litigation expenses,
including attorney's fees, 27 9 plus its requested "environmental-remedial
costs to alleviate harms attributed to ... past discharges." 2 80
Finally, the CWA creates criminal liability for either knowing or
negligent violations as well. 28' Where the government demonstrates the
necessary elements for either, any responsible corporate officer could face
criminal fines and/or potentially lengthy imprisonment.2 82
C. Implementation Costs & Legal Expenses Would Devastate an Already
FinanciallyFragileLogging Industry
As mentioned above, in recent decades the private logging industry
has steadily declined. From 2003 to 2012 the number of private logging
establishments dropped twenty-five percent,283 and logging capacity has
also fallen twenty-five percent since 2009.284 Over the past two decades,
domestic production of wood products is down across the board, with drops
in some areas even exceeding twenty-five percent.285 Higher costs, lower
demand, global competition, and increasing regulations, often carrying

33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2014).
action was filed on September 20, 2006, and the Court issued its opinion on March 20,
2013. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 3; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326 (2013). Assuming the Court's opinion ended the litigations, it continued for a total of 2,373 days,
which, at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)'s maximum of $25,000 per day per violation penalty, makes the
maximum civil penalty $59,325,000 per violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
29 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) ("The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant
to this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to
any prevailing or substantially prevailing party....").
280 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1335; see also First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at VII:B.
281See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
282 See id.; see also United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) ("We must therefore conclude that
[a negligent CWA violation under 33 U.S.C.] § 1319(c)(1)(A) requires only proof of ordinary
negligence."); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Under [33 U.S.C.] §
1319(c)(2)(A), the government was required to prove that Hopkins [(the defendant)] knew of the nature
of his acts and performed them intentionally, but was not required to prove he knew that those acts
violated the Clean Water Act, or any particular portion of that law, or the regulatory permit issued.").
283See Databases,Tables & Calculatorsby Subject, supra note 31.
284 See Agriculture: Forestry,supra note 21.
27

278 The

285

See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 32.
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greater compliance costs, appear to be driving the industry's decline.2 8 6 In
2010, fifty-one percent of private logging entities did not report a profit,
recording either a loss or revenue neutral year, 287 demonstrating the
industry's perilous financial position.
As a whole, the logging industry is very poorly prepared for the
potential costs of a nationwide NPDES permit requirement for all domestic
forest roads with Phase I point source discharges. This is particularly true
for highly localized, smaller logging operations, which make up a majority
of the industry,28 8 because they are unlikely to possess the large surpluses of
cash or liquidity necessary to meet new expenditures associated with
NPDES permitting programs. Furthermore, experts predict even higher
costs for smaller tract operators and inexperienced and/or understaffed
businesses, which would compound the problems small entities face. 28 9 An
opposite disposition in Decker, with the Supreme Court abandoning Auer
deference, requiring NPDES permits for similar forest roads, and imposing
their associated costs on the logging industry, would undercut an already
shrinking sector of the economy. Moreover, given business model
demographics and current financial strain, this may have even pushed
private logging over the edge, demolishing all but a few particularly strong
operations and substantially destroying nearly one million jobs. 29 0
VII. CONCLUSION

The Decker litigation and the Supreme Court's decision were
crucial for both environmental groups and private logging. For champions
of the environment, a positive disposition held the potential to impose a
uniform standard for all domestic forest roads utilizing Phase I point
sources that discharge pollutants into innumerable streams and rivers across
the country. Still, the Court's ultimate decision against logging road
NPDES permit requirements was perhaps more significant for private
timber harvesting operations because the consequences of implementing a
national permitting scheme, demonstrated by the monumental cost
estimates, might have shut down the industry almost entirely.
286 See GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 13 (discussing the impact of higher fuel and
equipment costs); see also id. at 19 (discussing the cost of federal regulation); Hard Times Hit US.
Hardwood Lumber Industry: Changing Consumer Tastes, Construction Downturns Have Slashed
Demand, supra note 39 (a drop in new housing starts from 2005 to 2011 reduced demand); Bowe, supra
note 40 (domestic paper product consumption is down, reducing demand); Agriculture: Forestry,supra
note 21 (China is an emerging and strong global competitor); Newman, supra note 41 (Brazil, Russia,
and China are expected to be important players over the next five years).

287 See GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 13.

288See Logging in the US: Market ResearchReport, supra note 27.
289 See COBBAGE & ABT, supra note
46.
290 See Agriculture:Forestry,supra note

21.
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Auer deference, the doctrine underlying the Court's decision and
rescue of private logging, as Justice Scalia's dissent illustrates, is an
unconstitutional violation of the Constitution's fundamental separation of
powers principles. By allowing agencies to interpret the regulations they
promulgate, administrative deference facilitates the consolidation of the
powers of three federal branches of government into one centralized
executive organization, and violates the power division described in the
Federalist Papers and the Constitution. On a deeper, more interesting level,
Auer deference is unconstitutional because the Court's creation and
perpetuation of the doctrine implicitly grants agencies quasi-judicial Article
III interpretive powers. In doing so, the federal judiciary infringes upon
congressional control over federal court jurisdiction, unconstitutionally
violating the separation of powers.
Despite this, the Court's impermissible adherence to the doctrine
produced more concrete benefits overall. Deference played a central role in
the Decker Court's holding. As Justice Scalia's fairest reading analysis
demonstrates, without it, NPDES permitting would have been required for
forest road Phase I point source discharges. Piling the overwhelming costs
on an already severely strained economic sector would have decimated the
U.S. domestic logging industry that is uniquely dominated by small
businesses. While the importance of environmental protection and
conservation should not be understated, destruction of the industry would
also mean the loss of approximately one million jobs, which are sorely
needed in today's economy. Consequently, the unconstitutional exercise of
Auer deference saved a valuable sector of the United States' economy,
demonstrating that the Decker decision ultimately benefited society.

